

Message Text

SECRET

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47

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

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R 211037Z JUN 74

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2835

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 3393

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, IS, JO, EG

SUBJ: ISRAEL'S DILEMMAS OVER JORDAN, GENEVA, AND

ABU RODEIS

1. IN INFORMAL CHAT JUNE 20 DOV ZAKIN, MEMBER OF KNESSET FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY COMMITTEE AND LONGTIME CLOSE FRIEND OF EMBASSY, TOLD US THAT GOI IN RECENT DAYS HAD BEEN DISCUSSING POSSIBLE NEXT MOVES TOWARD MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT WITH MODERATE MEMBERS OF THIS KNESSET COMMITTEE, INCLUDING ZAKIN. HE SAID GOI WAS TRYING TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO ABOUT JORDAN BUT WAS PARALYZED. GOI WAS IN QUANDRY ACCORDING TO ZAKIN BECAUSE (A) ISRAEL COULD NOT SIGN AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT OR INTERIM SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN WITHOUT CALLING NEW GENERAL ELECTION FIRST, AND RABIN GOVERNMENT WANTED TO AVOID ELECTION IN 1974 AT ALL COSTS IN ORDER TO HAVE CHANCE TO BUILD RECORD FOR ITSELF IN VOTERS' EYES; AND YET (B) ISRAEL REALIZED THAT ONLY WAY TO MAKE PALESTINIANS ACCEPT THAT BEST APPROACH FOR THEM WOULD BE TO COOPERATE WITH AMMAN WAS TO DEMONSTRATE ON GROUND, FOR ALL TO SEE, THAT JORDAN WAS INDEED CAPABLE OF ACHIEVING AT LEAST SOME ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BANK, VIZ UNDER JORDAN-ISRAEL DISENGAGEMENT OR INTERIM SETTLEMENT.

2. ZAKIN SAID ISRAELI LEADERS WERE FEARFUL ABOUT WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN ON PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION ISSUE IF GENEVA CONFERENCE

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WERE RECONVENED BEFORE PLO-HASHEMITE "UNDERSTANDING" HAD

BEEN WORKED OUT, AND YET ISRAELIS SENSED THAT US IN ORDER TO KEEP SOVIETS AT BAY WOULD NEED TO HAVE GENEVA CONFERENCE MEET AT SOME POINT BEFORE END OF 1974.

3. IN ZAKIN'S OPINION GOI WOULD PROBABLY DECIDE IN FAVOR OF INITIATING DIALOGUE SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT STARTING THIS SUMMER. DIALOGUE WITH JORDAN WOULD COVER ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF ISRAEL-JORDAN ISSUES AND WOULD BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE INTO 1975. DIALOGUE WITH EGYPT WOULD BE AIMED AT CONCLUDING AGREEMENT BEFORE END OF 1974 ON A SECOND PHASE OF EGYPT-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT. ZAKIN BELIEVED ISRAEL WOULD TRY FOR ARRANGEMENT UNDER WHICH ISRAELI FORCES WOULD WITHDRAW TO A LINE EAST OF MITLA AND GIDI PASSES BUT WHICH WOULD CURL TO NORTHERN PART OF GULF OF SUEZ SO AS TO LEAVE ABU RODEIS OIL FIELDS IN ISRAELI HANDS. IF EGYPT WOULD NOT AGREE TO SUCH LINE AND INSISTED ON GETTING BACK OIL FIELDS AS PART OF NEXT PHASE, ZAKIN SAID ISRAEL WOULD INSIST ON EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT TO SELL OIL TO ISRAEL. (HE STRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE TOUGH ON THIS ISSUE.)

4. ZAKIN DESCRIBED ISRAELI THINKING ABOUT MAIN CONCESSION THAT EGYPT SHOULD MAKE IN RETURN FOR NEXT STAGE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN SINAI AS CENTERING ON TERMINATION OF STATE OF BELLIGERENCY. GOI WOULD LIKE EGYPT TO TERMINATE BELLIGERENCY SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH NEXT STAGE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND DO ALL THE THINGS ATTENDANT ON TRUE TERMINATION OF BELLIGERENCY, SUCH AS END OF SECONDARY BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL. IF EGYPT BECAUSE OF ITS ARAB LEAGUE OBLIGATIONS INSISTED THAT MEANINGFUL EGYPTIAN STEPS TO TERMINATE BELLIGERENCY WOULD HAVE TO AWAIT FINAL EGYPT-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT, THEN ISRAEL WOULD DEMAND AS PART OF NEXT PHASE THAT CAIRO DEFINE WHAT STEPS IT EVENTUALLY WOULD TAKE TO MAKE TERMINATION OF BELLIGERENCY MEANINGFUL AND THAT EGYPT COMMIT ITSELF NOW TO TERMINATE ALL THESE ASPECTS OF BELLIGERENCY AS INTEGRAL PART OF FINAL EGYPT-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT.

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